From Chapter 3 of Kratzer’s the Event Argument, discussed today at the Semantics Reading Group:
The theme relation may not qualify as a ‘natural’ category at all. What are natural categories? Any theory of lexical acquisition must make some distinction between categories that are natural and those that are not. Very roughly, the natural categories are those that humans take to be candidates for denotations of simple lexical items, spontaneously and without any explicit instruction or definition. The most famous example of a non-natural category is the property ‘grue’ discussed by Nelson Goodman in the fifties. An object is grue if it is green and has been examined before a fixed time, say December 31, 2010, or else it is blue, and has not been examined before December 31, 2010. All emeralds that have been examined so far are grue as well as green. But for some reason - and this is Goodman’s puzzle - grueness, unlike greenness, is not a category that humans come up with naturally when presented with emeralds, grass, or frogs, for example. To be sure, the concept of grueness can be grasped by human minds, but if it is, it’s on the basis of a verbal definition. The theme relation may not be quite as gruesome as grueness, but unlike the agent relation, it may still not qualify as a natural relation.
Grue just lends itself so nicely to all sorts of cute puns. If I grue up, I’d stop being so amused by them ;-P
emma :: Mar.07.2007 ::
misc, semantics, philosophy, linguistics ::
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